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abstract:
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has introduced in December 2010 a
Basel III framework for more resilient banks and banking system. We posit in this pa-
per that, in addition to the current regulatory instruments currently under the review
of authorities, the currency diversification of banks’ balance sheets can be a source of
banking stability considering both assets and liabilities simultaneously. Our conclusions
are based on a simplified definition of a globalized bank’s balance sheet. As banks’
balance sheets are expressed in domestic currency, our model implies an exchange rate
conversion of each foreign component. Risks are introduced with stochastic processes
in assets, liabilities and exchange rate. In accordance with the Basel III framework and
the Basel III Leverage ratio, the bank’s leverage ratio is limited. Our model provides
detailed information in each risk faced by global banks including foreign exchange risk.
Although our conclusions depend on the variance covariance matrix of assets, liabilities
and foreign exchange rate, our main results confirm the positive impact of currency di-
versification on banking stability considering the current banking system.
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1 Introduction
Following Diamond and Rajan [2000], banks’ capital is a buffer against financial losses.
Thus, limiting the volatility of capital should improve the resilience of banks. By in-
troducing a Basel III framework, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision wants
to strengthen this natural buffer.1 A countercyclical ratio forces banks to rise capital
buffer during good time making them more comfortable during periods of stress. The
Basel III liquidity ratio ensures banks to have an access to liquidity even in periods of
stress. And finally, the Basel III leverage ratio avoids excess increase of banks’ balance
sheets and leverage. These ratios are still in discussion, but they would become fully
effective in January 2019.
An additional ratio which is not included in the Basel III framework could reinforce
capital buffer: the currency diversification of banks’ balance sheet. Currency diversifica-
tion introduces a diversification of risks in both assets and liabilities. Depending on the
correlation between financial markets and the exchange rate regime, currency diversifi-
cation may also decrease capital volatility thanks to spontaneous risk coverage between
assets and liabilities.
Theory on portfolio diversification provides interesting conclusions on risk diversifi-
cation. Markowizt [1952] shows that when returns are not perfectly correlated, diversi-
fication decreases risk. Levy and Sarnat [1970] and Driessen and Laeven [2007] focus on
international diversification, and they conclude to an optimal portfolio which implies a
diversification of international assets. However, they do not explicitly develop the role of
exchange rate. Focusing on CAPM definition, Reeb et al. [1998] , Kwok and Reeb [2000]
and Pedrono [2016] posit the benefit of international diversification on the decrease of
systemic risk. In the CAPM definition, Pedrono [2016] develops explicitly the exchange
1See BIS [2010] for more details.
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rate impact on beta. Depending on the exchange rate correlations with assets, inter-
national diversification decreases systemic risk even though foreign assets bring more
volatility.
Another part of the literature analyzes the effect of currency diversification on bank-
ing leverage. Pedrono [2015b] and Pedrono [2015a] look at the effect of currency di-
versification on leverage procyclicality. Focusing on banks located in France between
1999 and 2014, Pedrono [2015a] shows that currency diversification increases leverage
responsiveness to the value of assets.
Finally, Farhi et al. [2011] and Be´nassy-Que´re´ and Pisani-Ferry [2011] analyze the
potential impacts of a multipolar International Monetary and Financial System. They
posit that a second international currency increases and diversifies the supply of global
liquidity. Thus, the system should be more stable at least in the medium term.
The current literature demonstrates the importance of currency and international
diversification in some aspect of banking stability. However, it does not include a gen-
eral analysis of banking stability considering simultaneously risks from both assets and
liabilities. Thus, the purpose of our paper is to assess the role played by currency di-
versification in banking stability. By introducing simultaneously assets and liabilities in
the definition of capital, our paper contributes to the current literature. Additionally, it
implies a fixed leverage ratio similar to the Basel III leverage ratio. Thus, our analysis
fits into the new Basel III framework. Finally, our model provides detailed information
on each source of risks. We believe that our results may feed current discussions on
regulation. Relatively to the variance covariance matrix of assets, liabilities and foreign
exchange rate, our main results confirm the positive impact of currency diversification
on banking stability considering the current banking system.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains briefly the
global framework and the definition of a global bank. Section 3 develops the theoretical
framework based on a simplified definition of a bank’s balance sheet. We analyze in
section 4 the volatility of capital depending on the level of integration. This section
allows us to describe each source of risks in the determination of capital volatility and
to define an optimal level of currency diversification which ensures a minimum volatility
of capital. Finally, we illustrate our results with simulations in section 5.
2 A global framework
We consider two international currencies, a domestic and a foreign one. We define global
banks as a banks with a diversified balance sheet between the two currencies. Investments
are both in domestic and in foreign currency and funding are also denominated in both
currencies. Global framework is illustrated in Figure 2. As the system is symmetric,
we focus in this paper on the domestic global bank where its capital is denominated in
denominated in domestic currency.
Figure 1: Global framework with two international currencies.
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Currency diversification introduces a diversification of risks in both assets and liabil-
ities. Depending on the correlation between financial markets and exchange rate regime,
currency diversification may allow a decrease of capital volatility through a spontaneous
risk coverage.
3 Definition of Capital:
3.1 Assets
Bank’s total asset A is composed of domestic asset C and foreign asset converted in
domestic currency SC? where S is the foreign exchange rate. The share of domestic and
foreign asset are given by ψ and (1− ψ) respectively.
A = C + SC? (1)
C
A
= ψ ;
SC?
A
= (1− ψ)
Exchange rate and both assets follow stochastic processes with marginal variations de-
fined such that:
dC˜ =
dC
C
= r dt+ σCdZC (2)
dC˜? =
dC?
C?
= r? dt+ σC?dZC? (3)
dS˜ =
dS
S
= µ dt+ σSdZS (4)
r, r? and µ are the constant terms of the marginal variation of domestic asset, foreign
asset and foreign exchange rate respectively. White noises are denoted dZ such that
dZC ∼ N(0; dt), dZC? ∼ N(0; dt) and dZS ∼ N(0; dt). Defining stochastic processes
introduces risks in our model.
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3.2 Liabilities
Bank’s total debt D consists of domestic liabilities L and foreign liabilities converted in
domestic currency SL?. Denote λ and (1−λ) the share of domestic and foreign liabilities
respectively.
D = L+ SL? (5)
L
D
= λ ;
SL?
D
= (1− λ)
Introducing stochastic processes, we get the following Stochastic Differential Equations
(SDE) for each liability:
dL˜ =
dL
L
= i dt+ σL dZL (6)
dL˜? =
dL?
L?
= i?dt+ σL?dZL? (7)
Where dZL and dZL? are white noises and i and i
? are the constant term of the marginal
variation of domestic liability and foreign liability respectively also known as the constant
terms of the total cost of debt.
3.3 Capital
Bank’s capital is defined through K such that:
K = A−D (8)
Bank’s leverage l is the ratio of total assets over capital. Following the Basel III frame-
work, we assume that leverage is defined by authorities. Using the definition of l, we
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obtain the bank’s capital SDE:
dK˜ =
dK
K
= (1 + l)
dA
A
− l · dD
D
= (1 + l) [(ψ · r + (1− ψ)(r? + µ)) dt+ ψ · σCdZC + (1− ψ)(σC?dZC? + σSdZS)]
− l [(λ · i+ (1− λ)(i? + µ)) dt+ λ · σLdZL + (1− λ)(σL?dZL? + σSdZS)] (9)
In absence of diversification (e.g. ψ=1 and λ=1), the marginal variation of capital does
not depend on foreign component. The effect of total assets on capital is larger than the
effect of total liabilities because of their relative size (e.g. A > D). The introduction of
leverage ratio induces this asymmetry.
Although our analysis focuses on the capital volatility, studying the mean of capital
marginal variation also holds our interest. As diversification offers a second source
of both incomes and costs, the mean of capital marginal variation depends on interest
differentials and exchange rate impacts. The mean of capital marginal variation is defined
such that:
E(
dK˜
dt
) = (1 + l)[ψ · r + (1− ψ)(r? + µ)]− l[λ · i+ (1− λ)i? + µ)]
= (1 + l)[r? + ψ(r − r?)]− l[i? + λ(i− i?)] + µ[1− ψ + l(λ− ψ)] (10)
The expected marginal variation of capital is the difference between the total expected
return and the total expected total cost of debt. As assets and liabilities are diversified,
this definition includes the effect of foreign exchange rate on both assets and liabilities.
The first two components illustrate what the second source of investment and debt
implies regardless of exchange rate. The last component introduces the effect of exchange
rate. It shows an interesting result regarding currency mismatch. Even through ψ=λ,
the exchange rate still has an effect on capital except if there is not asset diversification
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(e.g. ψ=1). This is due to the relative size of A and L and the leverage ratio.
4 Volatility of capital with currency diversification
We look at three potential frameworks. First, we study the capital volatility when the
two economies are not integrated. Although this framework seems unlikely considering
the current European banking system, it provides a first simple baseline. Second, we
add partial integration by introducing a variance covariance matrix related to assets.
Finally, we allow a complete globalized framework where liabilities are also integrated.
This last framework is more likely considering our current framework.
4.1 No integration:
In this framework, we assume that components of the bank’s balance sheet are not linked
together. In addition, we suppose that the exchange rate is also completely independent.
When the two economies are not integrated, the variance of capital marginal variation
is thus defined such that:
Var(
dK˜
dt
) =((1 + l)ψ)2σ2C + ((1 + l)(1− ψ))2σ2C? + (1− ψ + l(λ− ψ))2σ2S
+ (l · λ)2σ2L + (l(1− λ))2σ2L? (11)
= Σ2
The volatility of capital Σ2 depends positively on risks from C, C?, L, L? and S.
As mentioned earlier, a currency match does not remove exchange rate risk except if ψ=1.
Regarding currency diversification, we notice that the variance is quadratic function
of ψ and λ. Thus, a currency diversification should allow a minimum capital volatility.
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4.1.1 Optimal diversification
The optimal level of asset denominated in domestic currency ψ̂ is defined as the level of
diversification which allows a minimum volatility of capital. In the absence of integration,
ψ̂ is defined such that:
∂Σ2
∂ψ
= 0
ψ̂ =
σ2C?
σ2C + σ
2
C? + σ
2
S
+
(lλ+ 1)
(1 + l)
σ2S
σ2C + σ
2
C? + σ
2
S
(12)
The first component is the ratio of foreign asset volatility to total assets volatility. Saying
differently, it is the share of total assets volatility driven by foreign asset volatility. The
higher the foreign asset volatility plays an important role in total asset volatility, the
lower the optimal asset diversification would be. The second component introduces the
exchange rate determinant. If λ=1 (e.g. no liabilities diversification), the exchange rate
volatility is as important as the foreign asset volatility in the determination of optimal
asset diversification. In this situtation, ψ̂ < 1 if σ2C is positive. If λ <1 (e.g. liabilities
are diversified), the foreign exchange risk becomes less important as foreign liabilities
induce a cover for this risk. Finally, the optimal asset diversification positively depends
on the diversification of liabilities.
The definition of optimal share of domestic liability λ̂ is the level of liability diversi-
fication that ensures a minimum volatility of capital. λ̂ is such that:
∂Σ2
∂λ
= 0
λ̂ =
σ2L?
σ2L + σ
2
L? + σ
2
S
+
(ψ(1 + l)− 1)
l
σ2S
σ2L + σ
2
L? + σ
2
S
(13)
The first component introduces the role of foreign liability in total liabilities volatil-
ity while the second component adds the role of the foreign exchange volatility. If ψ=1,
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then the two components have equal weight in the determination of λ̂. If domestic lia-
bility induces risk, λ̂ is lower than 1 and the model implies a currency diversification of
liability even through assets are not diversified. If ψ <1, foreign exchange risk implied
by liability diversification would be partly covered by asset diversification. Thus, foreign
exchange risk is less determinant than foreign liability risk.2 Finally and because of the
foreign exchange risk, λ̂ depends positively on ψ.
4.2 Partial Integration
We extend the previous framework by introducing correlations between assets and ex-
change rate and between the two assets. Thus, σCC? , σSC and σSC? denote the covariance
between the two assets, the covariance between the domestic asset and the exchange rate
and the covariance between the foreign asset and the exchange rate respectively. The
variance of capital marginal variation is such that:
Var(
dK˜
dt
) = Σ2 + 2(1 + l)2ψ(1− ψ)σCC?
+ 2(1− ψ + l(λ− ψ))(1 + l) [ψσSC + (1− ψ)σSC? ] (14)
= Σ2partial
σCC? introduces the potential systemic risk between the two assets. It adds volatility
compare to the previous framework volatility Σ2. The second line of Σ2partial develops
the effect of introducing correlations with exchange rate. If diversification of assets is
complete, ψ=(1−ψ) = 0.5, the impact of exchange rate is removed when σSC? = −σSC .
Finally and as mentioned previously, a currency match does not remove the additional
foreign exchange risk if ψ <1.
2Regarding the determinant role of σ2S ,
(ψ(1+l)−1)
l
is positive for l > 1−ψ
ψ
.
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4.2.1 Optimal diversification
Considering this new framework, the optimal asset diversification ψ̂partial is such that:
∂Σ2partial
∂ψ
= 0
ψ̂partial =
σ2C? − σCC? + σSC?
σ2C + σ
2
C? + σ
2
S + 2 (σCC? + σSC − σSC?)
+
(lλ+ 1)
(1 + l)
σ2S + σSC? − σSC
σ2C + σ
2
C? + σ
2
S + 2 (σCC? + σSC − σSC?)
(15)
The first line illustrates the share of net foreign asset volatility in total asset volatility
while the second line introduces the net share of exchange rate volatility. With these
two components, ψ̂partial highlights the additional risks of diversifying assets regardless
of risks implied by domestic asset. If λ=1 the two determinants are equally important
in the determination of ψ̂partial. The larger the share of net foreign asset volatility is,
the lower ψ̂partial (and similarly for the share of net foreign exchange volatility).
λ̂partial is the optimal liability diversification which minimizes capital volatility. It is
defined such as:
∂Σ2partial
∂λ
= 0
λ̂partial =
σ2L?
σ2L + σ
2
L? + σ
2
S
+
(ψ(1 + l)− 1)
l
σ2S
σ2L + σ
2
L? + σ
2
S
− (1 + l)
l
ψσSC + (1− ψ)σSC?
σ2L + σ
2
L? + σ
2
S
(16)
The composition of λ̂partial underlines the additional risks faced by banks when liabilities
are diversified. The first component illustrates the direct risk due to foreign liability while
the second component introduces the share of direct foreign risk and the currency match.
However, part of foreign exchange volatility may come from the diversification of asset.
Thus, the third line subtracts this additional volatility of exchange rate in order to only
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include the foreign exchange risk which is due to liability diversification. The more the
underlying risk of liability diversification is, the lower the optimal diversification should
be to ensure a minimum volatility.
4.3 Complete globalization
The globalized framework adds covariances relative to liabilities. Denote σLL? the co-
variance between liabilities. It introduces the potential systemic risk between the two
sources of funding. As assets and liabilities are potentially linked in a globalized frame-
work, we introduces four covariances denoted σLC , σL?C? , σL?C , σLC? . Finally, σSL?
and σSL illustrate the potential dependence between exchange rate and liabilities. Con-
sidering this new framework, the variance of capital marginal variation is defined such
that:
Var(
dK˜
dt
) = Σ2 + 2[(1 + l)2ψ(1− ψ)σCC? + l2λ(1− λ)σLL? ]
− 2(1 + l)l [ψ[λσLC + (1− λ)ψσL?C ] + (1− ψ)[(1− λ)σL?C? + λσLC? ]]
+ 2(1− ψ + l(λ− ψ))[(1 + l)(ψσSC + (1− ψ)σSC?)− l(λσSL + (1− λ)σSL?)]
= Σ2global (17)
The first line of Σ2global posits the potential systemic risk added by currency diver-
sification through the covariances σLL? and σCC? . σLL? does not offset σCC? except
when correlation is negative. The second line introduces a natural risk coverage between
assets and liabilities when the two economies are globalized. Shocks on C might be
covered by both shocks on L and L?, and similarly for shocks on C?. Thus, a positive
correlation between the cost of debt and the interest rate of asset makes the capital is
more resilient to shocks. Capital volatility is thus reduced by this spontaneous mecha-
nism. Finally, the third line introduces the exchange rate channels due to correlations.
When the bank’s balance sheet is not diversified, the foreign exchange risk is completely
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removed. If diversification is complete (e.g. ψ=0.5 and λ=0.5) and if σSC = −σSC? and
σSL = −σSL? , then diversification absorbs additional foreign exchange risks introduced
by the globalized framework. However, bank still faces foreign exchange risk due to
leverage and the relative size of A and D and the leverage ratio.
4.3.1 Optimal diversification
The optimal level of asset denominated in domestic currency in a globalized framework
ψ̂global is defined such as:
∂Σ2global
∂ψ
= 0
ψ̂global =
σ2C? − σCC? + σSC?
σ2C + σ
2
C? + σ
2
S + 2 (σCC? + σSC − σSC?)
+
(lλ+ 1)
(1 + l)
σ2S + σSC? − σSC
σ2C + σ
2
C? + σ
2
S + 2 (σCC? + σSC − σSC?)
− (1− λ)l
(1 + l)
σSL? + σL?C? − σL?C
σ2C + σ
2
C? + σ
2
S + 2 (σCC? + σSC − σSC?)
− λl
(1 + l)
σSL + σLC? − σLC
σ2C + σ
2
C? + σ
2
S + 2 (σCC? + σSC − σSC?)
(18)
ψ̂partial highlights the additional risks of diversifying assets regardless of risks implied
by domestic asset and total liabilities. In order to capture the net effect of asset diver-
sification, line three and four of ψ̂global subtract risks coming from liability composition.
Especially, the third line extracts the underlying risks of asset diversification explained
by foreign liabilities while the last line is relative to risks implied by domestic liabilities.
Thus, the optimal level of asset diversification is a decreasing function of the direct risk
implied by asset diversification and an increasing function of risks implied by liability
diversification.
Turning on the optimal level of liabilities denominated in domestic currency, a global
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framework implies a λ̂global such that:
∂Σ2global
∂λ
= 0
λ̂global =
σ2L? − σLL? + σSL?
σ2L + σ
2
L? + σ
2
S − 2(σSL + σLL? − σSL?)
+
(ψ(1 + l)− 1)
l
σ2S + σSL? − σSL
σ2L + σ
2
L? + σ
2
S − 2(σSL + σLL? − σSL?)
− (1− ψ)(1 + l)
l
σSC? + σL?C? − σLC?
σ2L + σ
2
L? + σ
2
S − 2(σSL + σLL? − σSL?)
− ψ(1 + l)
l
σL?C + σSC − σLC
σ2L + σ
2
L? + σ
2
S − 2(σSL + σLL? − σSL?)
(19)
As for ψ̂partial, λ̂global tries to underline the net risk of liability diversification. Thus,
the third line subtracts the potential risk coming from foreign asset while the third line
removes risks from domestic asset. Thus, the optimal level of currency diversification is
a negative function of its implied risk. The more liability diversification increases risk,
the less bank should diversify their liabilities to ensure a minimum volatility of capital.
5 Application
This section develops some simulations based on previous definitions of capital marginal
variation. As our interest in this paper in on the stability of global European banks,
we use the global framework with floating exchange rate and correlations between each
component of banks’ balance sheets. Moreover, BIS-Quarterly-Review [March 2015],
Pedrono [2015a] show that the US dollar is the first currency of denomination. Thus,
we assume that the United States are the second economy in our framework.
We assume that the two economies are alike with similar volatility on assets and
liabilities. Considering that economies are both linked to a global financial cycle, we
suppose that assets and liabilities are positively correlated. Because of the floating
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exchange rate, we add four assumptions on exchange rate correlations. First, we assume
a positive correlation between foreign assets and exchange rate ρS,C? . It means that an
increase of the foreign interest rate can be simultaneously observed with an appreciation
of the foreign currency. Second and for the same reason, we posit a negative correlation
between the domestic interest rate and the exchange rate ρS,C . Third and turning on
foreign liabilities, we based our assumption on the observed correlation between 2003 and
2010 between the 3 month Euribor and the euro dollar exchange rate. For this period,
the correlation between the our domestic funding market and the exchange rate was
negative and significant. Finally and by opposition, we suppose a positive correlation
between the foreign cost of debt and the exchange rate.3 Table 1 summarizes the initial
calibration of parameters where ρ denotes the assumed correlation between each source
of risks.
Table 1: Calibration of parameters
σ2S σ
2
C σ
2
C? σ
2
L σ
2
L?
10% 15% 15% 15% 15%
ρC,C? ρL,L? ρS,C? ρS,C ρS,L?
0.7 0.7 0.5 -0.5 0.5
ρL,S ρL,C ρL?,C? ρL?,C ρL,C?
-0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7
Figure 1) illustrates the variance of capital marginal variation relative to currency
diversification and initial calibrations. We believe that this scenario is close the one
faced by global European banks. As illustrated is (a), a complete currency mismatch (e.g.
ψ = 1 and λ = 0 or ψ = 0 and λ = 1) leads to the highest volatility of capital. Increasing
currency diversification of both assets and liabilities decreases the volatility. The light
blue area in (b) shows that capital volatility is reduced with currency diversification:
the minimum volatility of capital is not reached when ψ = λ = 1 or when ψ = λ = 0.
Additionally, our results suggest that currency diversification of assets should be close to
3Other assumptions are possible. However, assuming a positive correlation between domestic cost of
debt and exchange rate does not change the benefit of currency diversification.
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the currency diversification of liabilities in order to reduce capital volatility significantly.
(a) Variance of Capital (b) Benefit of currency diversification
Figure 2: Globalization with no systemic risk. x is equivalent to ψ the share of assets
denominated in domestic currency. The share of liabilities denominated in domestic currency λ
is capture by y. The variance of capital marginal variation is equal to z.
We change the initial calibration in Figure 2) by allowing systemic risk between assets
and liabilities (e.g. ρC,C? = ρL,L? = 1). In this situation, complete currency mismatch
still leads to the highest level of capital volatility. Although currency match reduces
gradually capital volatility, it does allow a minimum volatility as shown in (b).
(a) Variance of Capital (b) No benefit from currency diversification
Figure 3: Globalization with systemic risk on assets and liabilities. x is equivalent to
ψ the share of assets denominated in domestic currency. The share of liabilities denominated in
domestic currency λ is capture by y. The variance of capital marginal variation is equal to z.
We suppose in Figure 4 that the two economies are completely integrated. Implicitly,
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all correlations are at their maximum relative to the initial calibration. As previously,
complete currency mismatch implies large capital volatility. As shown in (b), currency
diversification with perfect match is as good as single currency framework. Both situa-
tions reach the minimum capital volatility.
(a) Variance of Capital (b) Benefit from currency diversification
Figure 4: Complete globalization and integration. Correlations equal either 1 or -1
depending on initial calibration. x is equivalent to ψ the share of assets denominated in domestic
currency. The share of liabilities denominated in domestic currency λ is capture by y. The
variance of capital marginal variation is equal to z.
Finally, we analysis capital volatility when the exchange rate is fixed in Figure 5).
In (a) previous calibrations hold. Maximum capital volatility is reached when banks
face complete currency mismatch. As diversification of assets and liabilities allows a
diversification of risks, the minimum capital volatility is clearly reached for complete
diversification (e.g. ψ = λ = 0.5). In (b), we introduce systemic risks between assets
and liabilities (e.g. ρC,C? = ρL,L? = 1). A complete mismatch of diversification leads
to higher capital volatility. Although rebalancing mismatch decreases capital volatility,
minimum capital volatility is reached when assets and liabilities are not diversified.
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(a) With no systemic risk (b) With systemic risk on assets and liabilities
Figure 5: Variance of capital when exchange rate is fixed. x is equivalent to ψ the share
of assets denominated in domestic currency. The share of liabilities denominated in domestic
currency λ is capture by y. The variance of capital marginal variation is equal to z.
Conclusion
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has introduced in December 2010 a Basel
III framework for more resilient banks and banking system. We posit in this paper that,
in addition to the current regulatory instruments currently under the review of author-
ities, the currency diversification of banks’ balance sheet can be a source of banking
stability when we focus on banks’ capital.
Our conclusions are based on a simplified definition of a globalized bank’s balance
sheet. As banks’ balance sheets are expressed in domestic currency, our model implies an
exchange rate conversion of each foreign component. Risks are introduced with stochas-
tic processes in assets, liabilities and exchange rate. In accordance with the Basel III
framework and the Basel III Leverage ratio, the bank’s leverage ratio is fixed by author-
ities.
Although our conclusions depend on the variance covariance matrix of assets, liabili-
ties and foreign exchange rate, our main results confirm the positive impact of currency
diversification on banking stability.
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By introducing simultaneously assets and liabilities in the definition of capital, our
paper contributes to the current literature and provides detailed information on each
source of risks. We believe that our results may feed current discussions on the terms
and conditions of Basel III regulation considering the current European banking system.
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